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RESUMo: o artigo busca estabelecer interfaces entre a Grande Depressão dos anos 1930 
sob o Padrão ouro e a Crise Europeia recente sob o Euro. Argumenta-se que, a despeito 
de suas especificidades, as duas crises revelaram os efeitos potencialmente nocivos, em 
termos econômicos e sociais, de arranjos institucionais que reduzem consideravelmente a 
autonomia das políticas monetária, fiscal e cambial dos países participantes, sem, entretanto, 
serem acompanhados pelo aumento da cooperação liderado por uma potência hegemônica, 
em âmbito global (no caso da Grande Depressão) ou regional (no caso da Crise Europeia), 
que não apenas seja capaz, mas que também esteja disposta a exercer as funções de 
comprador e emprestador de última instância, sobretudo em momentos caracterizados pelo 
aumento da incerteza, pela deterioração do estado geral das expectativas e pelo aumento da 
preferência pela liquidez. De fato, tanto os países do centro europeu no passado como os 
países da periferia europeia no período recente foram efetivamente empurrados em direção 
a ajustes deflacionários em que a redução de preços e salários foi acompanhada pela 
redução da produção e do emprego. Assim, na ausência da possibilidade de se restaurar 
a autonomia de política econômica, a superação da crise pressupõe, tanto antes – sob o 
padrão ouro – como atualmente – sob o Euro –, ações conjuntas destinadas a assegurar que 
a responsabilidade do ajuste seja distribuída igualmente entre as economias e que, portanto, 
algumas delas não sejam beneficiadas à custa de outras nesse processo.
PALAVRAS-ChAVE: padrão ouro; grande depressão; crise europeia; euro.
ABSTRACT: The paper aims to establish interfaces between the Great Depression of 
the 1930s under the Gold Standard and the recent European Crisis under the Euro. It is 
argued that, despite their specificities, both crises revealed the potentially harmful effects, 
in economic and social terms, of institutional arrangements that considerably reduce the 
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, vol. 37, nº 1 (146), pp. 147-166, January-March/2017
* Professor do Instituto de Economia da Universidade Estadual de Campinas (IE/Unicamp). E-mail:
giulianoliveira@gmail.com. Doutorando em economia no IE/Unicamp. E-mail: paulowwolf@gmail.com. 
Submitted: 1/June/2015; Approved: 24/February/2016.
147http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-31572016v37n01a08 Revista de Economia Política 37 (1), 2017  •  
148
autonomy of monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies of participating countries, without 
being accompanied by increased cooperation between them, which should be led by a 
global (in the case of the Great Depression) or regional (in the case of the European Crisis) 
hegemonic power, which is not only capable of, but is also willing to act as a buyer and 
lender of last resort, especially in circumstances characterized by increased uncertainty, the 
deterioration of the general state of expectations and increased liquidity preference. In fact, 
central European countries in the past and peripheral European countries nowadays were 
effectively pushed toward deflationary adjustments in which a reduction of prices and wages 
was accompanied by a reduction of output and employment levels. Thus, in the absence 
of the possibility of restoring the autonomy of economic policy, the overcome of the crisis 
necessarily requires, both before – under the Gold Standard – and nowadays – under the 
Euro –, joint actions aimed to assure that the responsibility for the adjustment will be 
equally distributed among all the economies, in order to avoid that some of them benefit at 
the expense of the others in this process.
KEyWoRDS: gold standard; great depression; European crisis; euro.
JEL Classification: F50; F55; N10. 
INTRoDUCTIoN
The outbreak of the European crisis in 2008 revealed the destabilizing poten-
tial of liberalized and deregulated finances. Under the almost instantaneous conta-
gious effect of the bankruptcy of the American investment bank Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008 due to the vast and growing interconnection among financial 
systems, many European countries faced difficulties only comparable to the con-
text of the Great Depression of the 1930’s. The sharp retraction of GDP and em-
ployment levels, as well as of international trade, were some of the main marks left 
by both crises.
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the recent European crisis consi-
dering the limitations imposed by the institutionality of the Euro over the econo-
mic policy of Eurozone countries, establishing a comparison to the institutionality 
of the British gold standard and its respective role in the Great Depression of the 
1930’s from a historical-structural approach.1 It is important to observe that these 
monetary standards correspond to a set of rules, and conventions that governs the 
monetary and financial relationships within each of these institutionalities.
In both cases, the loss of autonomy over economic policy, accompanied by a 
modest international cooperation system, contributed to the imposition of a seve-
re deflationary adjustment during those periods characterized by a radical increase 
of uncertainty. The analysis suggests that the recent European crisis makes the 
1 The historical-structural approach seeks to analyze the transformation, in time, of economic, social, 
and political structures that characterize reality. Therefore, it seeks to match the theoretical, historical, 
empirical, and quantitative analysis. See Missio, Jayme Jr., and oreiro (2015). 
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy  37 (1), 2017 • pp. 147-166
149
cooperation between countries of the region a crucial element to enable macroeco-
nomic adjustment alternatives to a recession.
This paper is organized into three sections, in addition to this introduction 
and the conclusion. Firstly, the main characteristics of the British gold standard 
that prevailed between 1819 and 1914 and that was restored in the 1920’s2, as 
well as the obstacles imposed by this arrangement to the recovery of the European 
economies in the context of the Great Depression, are discussed. Subsequently, the 
main characteristics of the institutionality of the Eurozone and the way they con-
tributed to the depth of the recent crisis are analyzed. Finally, both experiences are 
compared in light of selected data and indicators. 
ThE GoLD STANDARD AND ThE GREAT DEPRESSIoN oF ThE 1930’S
The gold standard in place during the Pax Britannica from 1819 to 1914 and, 
especially, between 1870 and 1914, was effectively a British gold standard, consi-
dering the British productive, commercial, and financial hegemonies, in a context 
of progressive development of a fiduciary currency (Triffin, 1972). The faculty of 
issuing the main currency of the international monetary system assured England 
greater flexibility than other countries during those periods characterized by high 
instability, as the latter, in contrast to the former, were obligated to defend their 
reserves with the purpose of preserving the credibility of the convertibility system. 
To all countries, except the country that issued the international currency, the ins-
titutionality of the British gold standard imposed (at least, to some degree) a defla-
tionary adjustment in adverse contexts.3 
After adopting the gold standard, countries were committed to purchasing 
and selling gold at a specific price in terms of their own currencies (Kenwood and 
Lougheed, 1992). England was the first country to adopt the gold standard, in the 
first half of 19th century. Up to the end of that century, most European countries 
had followed the English example. This was a consequence of the fact that sprea-
ding the monetary standard adopted by the hegemonic country to other countries 
facilitated their access to the most important market for goods and services and 
assured their access to the deepest and most liquid financial market of the time 
(Eichengreen, 2000; Polanyi, 1944).
on different occasions, Keynes proposed that a deflationary adjustment indu-
ced by the defense of international reserves had an extremely harmful impact on 
economies. In his opinion, since their central objective was to keep the convertibi-
2 According to Eichengreen (2000, p.78), a little more than forty-five countries had adopted the gold 
standard by 1931. In 1937, all of them had abandoned this system. 
3 The British gold standard implied a stricter institutionality than the one that prevailed later, under the 
edge of the gold-dollar standard between 1945 and 1971, in the context of American hegemony. See 
Eichengreen (2000, p.76).
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lity to a fixed parity, the gold standard functioned as a “straitjacket” that avoided 
the conception and the implementation of autonomous economic policies oriented 
toward full employment (Keynes, 1930). Furthermore, Keynes (1930) claimed that 
the process of adjustment of the balance of payments under the gold standard was 
clearly asymmetrical because it fundamentally fell on deficit countries through a 
recession and, consequently, a decrease of prices and wages. According to him, due 
to the impossibility to appeal to a devaluation of exchange rates and to the cost of 
a deflationary adjustment, the reciprocity in the process of adjustment of the ba-
lance of payments among surplus and deficit countries was clearly the wisest alter-
native available.  
In fact, before World War I, the adoption of cooperation measures among 
countries that adopted the gold standard with the explicit objective of avoiding 
the collapse of the monetary standard was not unusual. Such initiatives were often 
led by the hegemonic country of the time, England, and oriented towards increa-
sing the international reserves of central banks of economies in distress in order to 
assure their credibility and, as a consequence, to avoid their exit of the monetary 
standard. Therefore, Eichengreen (2000, p.63) claims that: 
This kind of international cooperation, while not an everyday event, 
was critical in times of crisis. It belies the notion that the gold standard 
was an atomistic system. Rather, its survival depended in collaboration 
among central banks and governments. 
Moreover, as demonstrated by Kindleberger (1986, 1989), there was at that 
time a country not only able, but also willing to take responsibility for the stabili-
ty of the system by carrying out two main functions, namely: i) to assure a market 
for goods and services of other countries whenever this market was required (the 
role of purchaser of last resort); and ii) to assure liquidity for other countries whe-
never such liquidity was required (the role of lender of last resort). By executing 
these two main functions, England was able to assure the prevalence of the British 
gold standard for an extensive period, despite the rigidities of this institutionality 
for participating countries. 
obviously, this cooperation under English leadership did not seek to avoid 
recession in countries where the deflationary adjustment was sufficient to restore 
the credibility of the monetary standard, or enable the adoption of countercyclical 
economic policies by national governments. Furthermore, this cooperation was 
limited to central countries, as peripheral countries did not endanger the mainte-
nance of the gold standard. Therefore, many Southern European and Latin Ameri-
can countries, for instance, had to bear severe deflationary adjustments or to sus-
pend convertibility and devaluate their currencies during periods characterized by 
adversities (Eichengreen, 2000).
Therefore, there were two interconnected pillars that supported the British 
gold standard, namely: i) the credibility deposited by the market in the capacity of 
national states to assure the convertibility of their currencies in gold at a fixed ra-
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te; ii) the cooperation among countries that adopted the British gold standard, led 
by the hegemonic country of this system with the purpose of enabling its proper 
operation and, thus, of providing the usufruct of its positive externalities (Kindle-
berger, 1986, 1989; Eichengreen, 2000).
The British gold standard was suspended in Europe after World War I, as the 
conflict destroyed the pillars that supported this monetary standard, which depen-
ded on singular geopolitical conditions. Most European countries restored the old 
system in the 1920’s, believing it would be possible to preserve the status quo ante. 
Nevertheless, after the end of the conflict, the conditions that prevailed at the end 
of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century no longer existed. Thus, 
those countries faced great difficulties to maintain it. To Eichengreen (2000), this 
was a consequence of the fact that countries had less freedom to not comply with 
the “rules of the game”4 without endangering the credibility and, consequently, the 
maintenance of the system. For him, the costs of contractionist economic policies 
oriented towards supporting the gold standard were no long feasible due to the 
expansion of political and social rights after the conflict. To Triffin (1972), the 
difficulty in restoring the British gold standard after World War I resulted from the 
progressive difference between the amount of money and gold available, in view 
of the progressive expansion of the fiduciary currency system.5 To Medeiros and 
Serrano (1999), the failure of the attempt to return to this system was a result of 
the loss of industrial competitiveness of England and of changes in international 
conditions that once allowed its support. Naturally, such explanations can be con-
sidered as being complementary. 
It is clear that the fragilization of the cooperation among countries certainly 
had an important role in making the restoration of the British gold standard af-
ter World War I impracticable. This was mostly due to the vacuum of hegemony 
within international relations that prevailed at the time. To Kindleberger (1986, 
1989), after World War I, England was no longer able to be responsible for the 
stability of the international monetary system, whereas the United States was 
not willing to do so. It created an empty space that significantly contributed to 
the difficulties of the 1920’s and to the Great Depression of the 1930’s (Mazzuc-
chelli, 2009).
In fact, the situation worsened after the last quarter of 1929, with the collapse 
4 They were: i) a rule setting forth the amount of currency in circulation and storage of gold the country 
had in order to assure the convertibility, a condition that would contribute to limit the assumption of 
high and persistent deficits in the current transactions account of the balance of payments by a certain 
country; ii) freedom to export or to import gold; and iii) a commitment with the maintenance of 
convertibility of national currency in gold at the fixed exchange rate. 
5 This is the notion behind the “Triffin Dilemma”. on one hand, upon incurring deficits in external 
accounts, the issuing country of the international main currency assures the provision of the liquidity 
required to expand international trade and investment. on the other hand, it endangers the maintenance 
of the convertibility system and, consequently, the prevailing monetary standard as a consequence of 
the growing unbalance between the quantity of money in circulation and the amount of gold available.
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of the New york Stock Exchange and its consequences in Europe. In the absence 
of an international cooperation system, countries were forced to adopt rigorous 
contractionist economic policies, making the economic, social, and political crises 
even worse. only after leaving the gold standard could they adopt countercyclical 
economic policies and embark on a recovery path, which was consolidated with 
the expenses induced by World War II. In addition to the use of monetary and fis-
cal policies, most of the countries opted to devaluate their exchange rates and to 
adopt protectionist commercial policies. however, these policies are questionable 
in the extent that they presuppose that the gain of one is the loss of another, fur-
ther hindering the effort of joint recovery (Keynes, 1936).
In this regard, the case of United Kingdom is rather illustrative. In 1925, the 
British restored the convertibility of the pound in gold at the rate that prevailed 
before the war. This meant an over-valued exchange rate, which exacerbated the 
growing unbalances in the British balance of payments and required the mainte-
nance of a rigorous deflationary adjustment, with serious consequences in terms of 
output, income, and employment, as alerted by Keynes (1925). The return to the 
gold standard led to the prostration of the British economy throughout the 1920’s, 
especially after the 1929 crisis. The attempt to defend the reserves and, thus, the 
convertibility in that adverse context, made the economic, social, and political 
costs unbearable, leading the United Kingdom to abandon the gold standard and 
to devaluate the pound in 1931. The British decision certainly ended up quicke-
ning the abandonment of this system by other countries.6
Therefore, the institutionality of the British gold standard imposed to the par-
ticipating countries the deflationary adjustment as a consequence of its strictness. 
It could survive while the credibility of the markets in this system and the coope-
ration among the main countries reminded strong. When the cooperation became 
no longer possible, the entire system fell apart. 
ThE EURo AND ThE RECENT EURoPEAN CRISIS
In the years that followed the end of World War II, European countries took 
the first steps towards what would become the most audacious regional integra-
tion project in history. In 1951, the Treaty of Paris created the European Coal and 
Steel Community, which was responsible for controlling the production and trade 
of essential resources to the reconstruction of the economies of its member coun-
tries. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community, a 
customs union, and the European Atomic Energy Community, which was respon-
sible for increasing cooperation in the nuclear field. In 1965, the three communi-
ties began to share the same executive, legislative and judiciary institutions within 
the European Community, created by the Treaty of Brussels. In 1985, after a pe-
6 other experiences are also remarkable, such as that of France and Germany. See Mazzucchelli (2009).
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riod of modest advances, preparations were initiated for the creation of a common 
market through the elimination of all remaining barriers to the free movement of 
goods, services, people, and capital.7 The Single European Act of 1986 assured the 
required institutional changes for that. In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty created the 
European Union, which was responsible for improving cooperation among mem-
ber countries, not only in the economic dimension, but also in the social and poli-
tical dimensions. The Maastricht Treaty was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
in 1997, by the Treaty of Nice in 2001, and by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 (oli-
veira, Deos, and Wolf, 2014). 
It is important to emphasize the shift of conception of the European regional 
integration project over time. originally oriented towards fostering the recons-
truction and the economic, social, and political modernization in an adverse con-
text through international cooperation, the European project became, with time, 
more associated with the conventional conception about what a regional integra-
tion project should be – namely, a second-best initiative oriented towards intensi-
fying the flows of goods, services, and capital among different countries of a re-
gion through the acceleration of trade and the processes of financial liberalization 
and deregulation (Raimundo, 2011). 
The idea of creating a common currency existed since the beginning of the 
European regional integration process. In fact, different arrangements were crea-
ted to assure the stability of exchange rates among European currencies after the 
collapse of the Bretton-Woods arrangement.8 But it was only at the end of the 
1980’s and the beginning of the 1990’s that the pressures in favor of a monetary 
union increased considerably. Following the recommendations of the Delors Re-
port of 1989, the Maastricht Treaty initiated the process that would lead to the 
creation of a common currency. The coordination between monetary, fiscal, and 
exchange rate policies of member countries was reinforced and it was decided that 
those that wished to adopt the common currency must assure the convergence of 
their inflation rates, long-term interest rates, exchange rates, public deficits, and 
public debts. This process was concluded in 1999 with the creation of the Euro, 
which would begin to circulate three years later, in 2002. Currently, nineteen out 
of the twenty-eight member countries of the EU adopt the Euro. Among the nine 
remaining member countries, some of them are still not qualified to adopt it, whi-
le others opted to preserve their old currencies.9 
7 In a “customs union”, the participating countries eliminate the existing barriers to free movement of 
goods and services among themselves and adopt a common commercial policy with regard to non-
participant countries. In the “common market”, the participating countries also eliminate the existing 
barriers to the circulation of people and capital, which requires greater coordination among their 
policies. 
8 This is the case of the “European snake”, created in 1917, and the “European Monetary System”, 
created in 1979. In practice, in both cases, the European countries were subject to guidelines of 
Germany’s economic policy. See Eichengreen (2000).
9 The countries that adopt the Euro are: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
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The European countries that opted to adopt the Euro no longer have auto-
nomy over their economic policies. The monetary and exchange rate policies beca-
me the responsibility of the European Central Bank, an independent institution 
whose central objective is to maintain a low and stable inflation rate by handling 
the short-term interest rate.10 on the other hand, the fiscal policy remained a res-
ponsibility of national governments, but it was subjected to the rules of the Stabi-
lity and Growth Pact. The agreement requires the commitment of member coun-
tries with budgetary discipline throughout the business cycle, avoiding public 
deficits above 3% of GDP and public debts above 60% of GDP, under penalty of 
sanctions. These sanctions consist of a non-remunerated deposit, which can be 
transformed into a fine if the budgetary unbalances are not corrected within the 
defined term. however, the application of these sanctions is not automatic, and 
depends on the assessment of the circumstances by the Council of Ministers. With 
these measures, the fiscal policy was expected to become compatible with the gui-
delines of the monetary and exchange rate policies defined by the BCE (Arestis 
and Sawyer, 2011).
In fact, the institutionality of the monetary union indicates that European 
authorities define their actions considering the behavior of nominal variables. 
From the conventional point of view, the notion that prevails is that monetary 
policy must be oriented exclusively towards the maintenance of a low and stable 
inflation rate, while the other instruments of economic policy must be subordina-
ted to it. 
After the creation of the common currency, financial institutions, families, and 
companies from countries of the European periphery benefited from a credit ex-
pansion sponsored by central countries11, assuming increasingly riskier financial 
positions. The market attributed to the former the same risk it attributed to the 
latter, disregarding the fact that these economies were very different from each 
other. In a certain way, it can be inferred that the lenders adopted the convention 
that the strongest economies would rescue the weakest ones if needed, in order to 
assure the survival of the common currency and its institutionality.12 As shown in 
Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, and 
Portugal. The countries that do not adopt the common currency are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, 
hungary, Poland, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Romania, and Sweden. 
10 Although the Central Bank of Europe does not legally adopt the regime of inflation targets, it can be 
said that it actually does so, in the extent that it seeks an inflation rate of approximately 2%. 
11 As proposed by Dow (1982) and according to the structural characteristics of their economies, the 
European countries can be classified into central and peripheral ones, considering the reality of the 
region.
12 According to the data of BIS, between the beginning of 2005 and the beginning of 2008, the exposure 
of German, French, Dutch, Belgic, and Austrian banks increased, on average, 8.1% in the case of assets 
of Greece, 7.1% of Spain, 7.9% of Ireland, and 5.9% of Portugal. however, between the second half 
of 2008 and the second half of 2013, the exposure of these banks reduced, on average, by 7.0% in the 
case of Greek assets, 3.7% Spanish, 5.3% Irish, and 5.1% Portuguese (Belluzzo, 2013).
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Graph 1, the long-term interest rates of countries such as Spain, Greece, Ireland, 
and Portugal quickly converged towards the long-term interest rates of Germany 
between 1993 and mid-2008.
Graph 1: Short term interest rates (Eurozone) and long term  
interest rates (Germany and the PIGS) (%) – 1993 to 2013
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Central Europe Peripheral Europe I Peripheral Europe II 
(B
) (A
) 
Public debt Private debt 
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934
France 94 100 97 91 85 91 91
Germany 100 100 99 91 84 90 98
Italy 97 100 95 95 98 97 97
Sweden 93 100 104 103 100 103 111
United Kingdom 97 100 99 94 95 98 104
Greece 94 100 98 94 101 107 110
Ireland 97 100 102 105 103 100 103
Portugal 90 100 99 104 106 113 118
Spain 93 100 97 94 96 94 98
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
France 93 100 92 89 95 88 91
Germany 92 100 90 89 96 90 93
Italy 94 100 89 87 91 82 83
Sweden 98 100 82 93 106 102 107
United Kingdom 109 100 80 80 84 84 82
Greece 93 100 92 83 81 70 69
Ireland 95 100 89 84 89 83 86
Portugal 93 100 92 89 92 83 84
Spain 92 100 91 87 91 83 84
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X M X M X M X M X M X M
France 104 92 100 100 85 90 61 72 39 51 37 49
Germany 91 104 100 100 89 77 71 50 42 35 36 31
Italy 98 103 100 100 80 80 66 54 45 38 39 34
Sweden 87 96 100 100 86 93 57 75 36 45 38 39
United Kingdom 99 97 100 100 78 86 50 66 36 42 34 38
Greece 87 94 100 100 83 79 60 66 38 38 33 28
Ireland 97 98 100 100 95 92 72 77 40 77 28 50
Portugal 96 106 100 100 88 96 70 62 53 48 51 61
Spain 100 110 100 100 109 89 46 43 35 36 32 31
X M X M X M X M X M X M
France 91 88 100 100 78 78 86 86 98 101 94 95
Germany 91 88 100 100 77 78 87 89 101 105 97 97
Italy 92 91 100 100 75 74 82 87 97 100 92 87
Sweden 92 90 100 100 71 71 86 88 102 104 94 96
United Kingdom 96 98 100 100 77 76 89 89 103 100 105 109
Spain 91 93 100 100 80 69 88 75 107 87 102 78
Greece 92 85 100 100 79 75 85 72 124 68 138 70
Ireland 96 102 100 100 92 74 93 71 100 79 93 74
Spain 91 93 100 100 80 69 88 75 107 87 102 78
2011 2012
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2007 2008 2009 2010
Great Depression
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934
France 100   - 103 103 98  -  -
Germany 88 100 116 135 135 137 138
Italy 99 100 101 105 109 111 117
Sweden 99 100 98 101 117 129 128
United Kingdom 100 100 100 100 100 103 105
Greece 96 100 101 108 113 113 113
Ireland 94 100 107 122 132 130 206
Portugal 102 100  -  - 72 73 72
Spain 93 100 100 99 102 105 104
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
France 92 100 113 120 129 138 144
Germany 96 100 107 125 127 132 131
Italy 96 100 106 111 114 119 124
Sweden 101 100 106 106 108 110 120
United Kingdom 82 100 124 151 168 181 190
Greece 91 100 114 125 135 115 121
Ireland 59 100 131 181 239 264 271
Portugal 94 100 114 135 153 166 171
Spain 87 100 129 148 169 203 220P
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Source: OECD. Elaborated by the authors.
The decisions concerning the allocation of wealth by the economic actors 
from central countries influence the business cycle of peripheral countries. Althou-
gh the banks of these countries generally have a smaller relative capacity to finan-
ce the expansion of expenditures in advantageous conditions, in terms of volume, 
costs, and the terms of loans13, the purchase of assets of economies of European 
peripheral countries by investors of central countries encouraged a process of con-
vergence of the interest rates of the economies in the region. For the countries of 
the European periphery, this movement contributed to extend the liquidity of the 
financial system and, consequently, to increase the capacity and willingness of the 
banks of these economies to extend their credit operations. According to Belluzzo 
(2013, p.12):
[...] the convergence of interest rates and other credit conditions de-
termin d a strong flow of capitals to the so-called countries of European 
periphery, over heating their economies. As a result of monetary union, 
the competiti n between German, French, Swede, Austrian and English 
banks fostered an amazing intra-European ‘movement of capitals’. [our 
translation]
Nevertheless, after the outbreak of the global crisis in 2008, a sudden inter-
ruption of credit from central countries to peripheral countries of the region can 
13 See, for instance, Dow (1987a; 1987b); Chick and Down (1988); Amado and Mollo (2004).
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be observed. Countercyclical interventions from governments followed, leading to 
the socialization of private losses. however, the increase of their expenditures and 
the reduction of their receipts led to an increase of public deficits and public debts. 
In this context, the risk classification agencies reduced the sovereign ratings of the 
European peripheral countries and the market began to lend to these economies in 
more unfavorable conditions, also requiring them to implement severe fiscal ad-
justments (Freitas, 2011). 
The fear that governments would not be able to pay their debts was due to 
the fact that, although these debts were denominated in Euros, these Euros are is-
sued by a supranational institution, the European Central Bank. Because fiscal 
authorities cannot appeal to the monetary authority for assistance as a measure of 
last resort, the fear of the conversion of a liquidity crisis into a solvency crisis ine-
vitably spread among the economic actors (De Grawe, 2011).
As shown in Graph 1, after the crisis, the divergence of the long-term interest 
rates from peripheral countries in relation to the long-term interest rates from 
central countries and to the short-term interest rates of the Eurozone revealed that 
there is not only one Euro in the region, but many of them, each reflecting the 
economic and political importance of the countries that adhered to the monetary 
union (oliveira, Deos, and Wolf, 2012). Not even the rescue mechanisms created 
by the “Troika” (formed by the European Commission, the European Central 
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) in mid-2010, to which the peripheral 
countries would have access only under explicit commitment of advancing in the 
implementation of a fiscal adjustment, were able to revert the movement of incre-
asing long-term interest rates. In fact, this movement was only contained and sub-
sequently reverted through a more incisive intervention of the European Central 
Bank in the market, notably after mid-2012. 
Furthermore, during the years of credit expansion, the rapid increase of labor 
costs in the most backward economies of the region, in addition to the relatively 
weak growth of productivity and to the impossibility of carrying out an autono-
mous devaluation of exchange rates, led to a competitive disadvantage of periphe-
ral countries in relation to central economies, especially Germany after the labor 
market reforms carried out by the social-democrat government of Gerhard Schrö-
der in the first half of the 2000’s (Bresser, Pereira, and Rossi, 2014). Thus, it is 
possible to observe an increase of imports compared to exports of peripheral eco-
nomies and, consequently, a deviation of the already weakened domestic demand 
to the exterior.  
In this context, the countries of the European periphery were induced to make 
the so-called “structural reforms”.14 In fact, even in a context of a deep crisis, the 
governments were pressed to increase receipts and reduce expenses. Simultaneou-
sly, The European Central Bank reacted late to reduce the short-term interest rate 
and, when it did so, it was less aggressive than the central banks of other countries. 
14 Expression designated by the markets for the implementation of liberalization reforms. 
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Considering its traditional conservative position, its decision to accept bonds of 
the most indebted countries of the Eurozone as collateral in its operations with the 
banking system was really remarkable. It helped revert the falling trajectory of the 
prices of those papers and, thus, the increasing trajectory of long-term interest ra-
tes, thereby reducing pressure on governments of those countries after 2012. 
Thus, the crisis required a serious deflationary adjustment from countries of 
the periphery of the Eurozone, which was similar to the adjustment mechanism of 
the British gold standard to non-issuing countries of the international currency in 
adverse situations. As already shown by the ill-fated defense of the gold standard 
in the 1930’s, the attempt to adopt an adjustment of this type in an adverse con-
text contributes to exasperate the crisis and its perverse social effects.
ThE EURoPEAN CRISIS UNDER ThE EURo AND ThE GREAT 
DEPRESSIoN UNDER ThE GoLD STANDARD
The limits imposed by the British gold standard to the management of econo-
mic policy and its consequences in crises are not very different from those curren-
tly introduced by the monetary union in Europe, although there are important 
differences between both periods, such as the integration degree among the coun-
tries participating in these arrangements. This is due to the fact that in the context 
of the Great Depression of 1930’s as well as in the most recent crisis, the European 
countries were subject to an institutionality that imposes the deflationary adjust-
ment under the reduction of the autonomy over monetary, exchange rate, and fis-
cal policies, as well as under the absence of a cooperation system between the 
economies of the region. 
With the purpose of analyzing the specificities and interfaces between both 
periods selected, production and trade indicators for representative countries of 
the European center and periphery, namely Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Fran-
ce, and Sweden, on one hand, and Spain, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, on the 
other, respectively, were considered.15
Table 1 shows the behavior of the GDP of selected European countries betwe-
en 1928 and 1934, including the context of the Great Depression, as well as be-
tween 2007 and 2013, involving the period of recent crisis.16 In the majority of the 
15 Data on employment and unemployment were not included because they are available only for some 
selected countries. Moreover, in these cases, there are interruptions in temporal series, the methodologies 
of different countries are not compatible, and the criteria for data submission do not follow the same 
standard. For instance, while some countries considered as unemployed those who were looking for a 
job, others considered as unemployed those who received some form of support in the absence of an 
occupation. Furthermore, in some cases, the data are related only to the number of people considered 
unemployed, while in other cases it also considers the ratio between the number of unemployed people 
and the number of employees. For such limitations, see the League of Nations (1935). 
16 It is necessary to consider the existence of different ascertainment methodologies of GDP between 
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considered countries, 1928, as well as 2007, represent the last years of expansion. 
on the other hand, 1929, as well as 2008, represent the years when the crisis be-
came explicit and for this reason they are considered the base periods. over the 
following years, these countries began to face profound crises. In fact, it can be 
observed that in both moments there was a sudden and violent fall of GDP of the 
countries of the region. 
The data shown in Table 1 indicate that, in general, while in the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930’s the central countries were the most impacted in terms of reduc-
tion of production levels, in the recent crisis, the periphery countries were the most 
harmed. once more, this reflects the existing inequalities among the countries that 
are part of the European monetary union. For instance, while the GDP of Ger-
many fell 10% and that of Greece increased 7% between 1929 and 1933, the GDP 
of Germany fell 10% and that of Greece decreased 30% between 2008 and 2012.17
The same happened in the cases of Italy and the United Kingdom. Despite 
being central countries, the impact of the recent crisis was comparable to that ob-
served in peripheral countries. In fact, for having one of the highest public debts in 
Europe, Italy was forced to implement a deflationary adjustment similar to that 
carried out by countries such as Spain, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. on the other 
hand, the performance of the United Kingdom is due to the impact of the crisis on 
the important financial sector of the country, as well as to the resistance of the 
conservative government to adopt more flexible economic policies in order to face 
the retraction of private consumption and investment. Not even the devaluation of 
the pound was able to encourage recovery through an increase of exports as a 
consequence of the situation of other European countries, which are British main 
trade partners.
Table 1 also shows that, in the case of the Great Depression of the 1930’s, the 
fall of economic activity continued up to 1932, starting a recovery trajectory since 
then. Nevertheless, the strength of this process was related to the moment when 
the countries abandoned the gold standard and began to adopt countercyclical 
policies. It occurred earlier in the case of Germany, England, and Sweden and later 
in the case of France and Italy. In the case of the recent crisis, the fall of GDP oc-
curred after 2009. This movement is closely related to the progressive stiffening of 
fiscal adjustments carried out in a context characterized by the contraction of ex-
both considered periods. The calculation of the GDP of each country in the period of Great Depression 
of the 1930’s was based on estimates grounded on available registrations about the production of 
different sectors of economy, in view of inexistence of the required rules and norms to assure the 
standardization of National Accounts and, more specifically, from calculation of total wealth produced 
by different countries in a certain period. More emphatic initiatives in this regard occurred after World 
War II, with the creation of multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations and the International 
Monetary Fund. Regarding this matter, see Maddison (1995).
17 Differently from that context, the most recent crisis occurred in an environment where social 
protection systems are available. however, it must be observed that the institutionality of Welfare State 
in European countries has different sophistication levels, being less comprehensive and inclusive in the 
periphery countries (Wolf, 2015).  
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penses of the private sector, and which were ultimately a requirement of the ma-
rket, sanctioned by the European institutions, to the countries of the region.
Concerning international trade, Table 2 shows the behavior of export and 
import indexes, also in both periods considered. Although in both moments there 
was a remarkable fall in trade relations due to the reduction of the level of activity 
in the region as whole, this fall was much greater in the context of the Great De-
pression compared to the period of the recent crisis. In the first case, the exports 
and imports corresponded to almost 40% of the values observed in 1929, while in 
the second they corresponded to approximately 80% of the observed values in 
2008. This is mostly a consequence of the fact that, at that time, European coun-
tries appealed to the devaluation of exchange rates and to the adoption of protec-
tionist commercial policies after abandoning the gold standard.18 Moreover, the 
deflationary adjustment carried out by the peripheral countries certainly produced 
an expressive improvement in their respective trade balances.
18 Currently, the adoption of such measures is not possible, even in the case of the trade between 
European countries, which is responsible for the greatest part of international trade of EU countries in 
general and of Eurozone in particular, as a result of the rules of common market and limits imposed by 
the adoption of the Euro.
Table 1: Gross Domestic Product (selected countries)  
(1929 = 100 and 2008 = 100) – 1928 to 1934 and 2007 to 2013
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Central Europe Peripheral Europe I Peripheral Europe II 
(B
) (A
) 
Public debt Private debt 
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934
France 94 100 97 91 85 91 91
Germany 100 100 99 91 84 90 98
Italy 97 100 95 95 98 97 97
Sweden 93 100 104 103 100 103 111
United Kingdom 97 100 99 94 95 98 104
Greece 94 100 98 94 101 107 110
Ireland 97 100 102 105 103 100 103
Portugal 90 100 99 104 106 113 118
Spain 93 100 97 94 96 94 98
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
France 93 100 92 89 95 88 91
Germany 92 100 90 89 96 90 93
Italy 94 100 89 87 91 82 83
Sweden 98 100 82 93 106 102 107
United Kingdom 109 100 80 80 84 84 82
Greece 93 100 92 83 81 70 69
Ireland 95 100 89 84 89 83 86
Portugal 93 100 92 89 92 83 84
Spain 92 100 91 87 91 83 84
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X M X M X M X M X M X M
France 104 92 100 100 85 90 61 72 39 51 37 49
Germany 91 104 100 100 89 77 71 50 42 35 36 31
Italy 98 103 100 100 80 80 66 54 45 38 39 34
Sweden 87 96 100 100 86 93 57 75 36 45 38 39
United Kingdom 99 97 100 100 78 86 50 66 36 42 34 38
Greece 87 94 100 100 83 79 60 66 38 38 33 28
Ireland 97 98 100 100 95 92 72 77 40 77 28 50
Portugal 96 106 100 100 88 96 70 62 53 48 51 61
Spain 100 110 100 100 109 89 46 43 35 36 32 31
X M X M X M X M X M X M
France 91 88 100 100 78 78 86 86 98 101 94 95
Germany 91 88 100 100 77 78 87 89 101 105 97 97
Italy 92 91 100 100 75 74 82 87 97 100 92 87
Sweden 92 90 100 100 71 71 86 88 102 104 94 96
United Kingdom 96 98 100 100 77 76 89 89 103 100 105 109
Spain 91 93 100 100 80 69 88 75 107 87 102 78
Greece 92 85 100 100 79 75 85 72 124 68 138 70
Ireland 96 102 100 100 92 74 93 71 100 79 93 74
Spain 91 93 100 100 80 69 88 75 107 87 102 78
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Great Depression
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934
France 100   - 103 103 98  -  -
Germany 88 100 116 135 135 137 138
Italy 99 100 101 105 109 111 117
Sweden 99 100 98 101 117 129 128
United Kingdom 100 100 100 100 100 103 105
Greece 96 100 101 108 113 113 113
Ireland 94 100 107 122 132 130 206
Portugal 102 100  -  - 72 73 72
Spain 93 100 100 99 102 105 104
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
France 92 100 113 120 129 138 144
Germany 96 100 107 125 127 32 131
Italy 96 100 106 111 114 119 124
Sweden 101 100 106 106 108 110 120
United Kingdom 82 100 124 151 168 181 190
Greece 91 100 114 125 135 115 121
Ireland 59 100 131 181 239 264 271
Portugal 94 100 114 135 153 166 171
Spain 87 100 129 148 169 203 220P
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Source: Maddison (2008) and IMF. Elaborated by the authors. 
Note: Since there is no information available for all countries that today are part of the EU,  
representative countries from the center and the periphery of the bloc were selected. 
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Table 2: Exports (X) and Imports (M) (selected countries)  
(1929 = 100 and 2008 = 100) – 1928 to 1933 and 2007 to 2012
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Portugal 90 100 99 104 106 113 118
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Italy 96 100 106 111 114 119 124
Sweden 101 100 106 106 108 110 120
United Kingdom 82 100 124 151 168 181 190
Greece 91 100 114 125 135 115 121
Ireland 59 100 131 181 239 264 271
Portugal 94 100 114 135 153 166 171
Spain 87 100 129 148 169 203 220P
e
ri
p
h
e
ra
l 
E
u
ro
p
e
 I
Great Depression
C
e
n
tr
al
  
  
  
 
E
u
ro
p
e
P
e
ri
p
h
e
ra
l 
E
u
ro
p
e
 I
Euopean Crisis
C
e
n
tr
al
  
  
  
 
E
u
ro
p
e
Source: League of Nations (1935) and UNCTAD. Elaborated by the authors.
In order to avoid the deflationary adjustment, an intense cooperation system 
among superavit and deficit countries of the region, led by a hegemonic center that is 
able to assume the functions of purchaser and lender of last resort would be required. 
In this regard, similarly to England after World War I and the United States after 
World War II, Germany has an important role to play in Europe with regard to afore-
mentioned functions in the scale required to overcome the crisis. however, this would 
require a limit to the high trade superavits that Germany maintains with regard to the 
countries of the European periphery, something that Germans do not accept.
Such initiative would make a great contribution to a less asymmetric way to 
adjust the Eurozone economies. An alternative to it would be, for instance, the 
implementation of an internal European commercial policy that is functional for 
the necessities of the most fragile economies of the bloc, allowing them to reintro-
duce the control over the flows of goods and services through an increase in tariff 
barriers with regard to less fragile economies. It would require an amendment of 
the treaties in force through a specific legislative process, although the European 
institutions explicitly acknowledging that the process of opening national borders 
must consider the extent of the effort that the economies must bear or, in other 
words, the existing differences among them in regard to their degree of develop-
ment. By fostering the favorable adjustment of relative prices, this type of policy 
would have the same effect of an exchange rate devaluation, with the advantage of 
affecting the trade relations among European countries.19 This type of measure 
19 It must be highlighted that this kind of commercial policy in a project of regional integration was 
defended by ECLA in the second half of 20th century. For details, see Amado and Mollo (2004). 
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could be followed by actions of supranational institutions aimed at transforming 
the productive structures and at increasing the competitiveness of the weakest 
economies of the region.20 
It is interesting to register that, although insufficient to avoid the deflationary 
adjustment, the state interventions immediately following the outbreak of the re-
cent crisis were an important differential compared to the Great Depression, pre-
venting it from being even deeper. The imbalances in the public accounts of most 
countries of the European periphery resulted (to a great extent) from the “sociali-
zation of private losses” and from the attempt to avoid a significant fall of de-
mand. Except for Greece, where there was consistent evidence of excesses, the 
public accounts of the periphery countries were relatively balanced up to the out-
break of the crisis in 2008. Portugal had levels of public deficit and public debt 
comparable to those of the main central countries (around -3% and 60% of GDP, 
respectively), and the levels of deficit and debt of Spain and Ireland were among 
the smallest of the EU (around 1% and 40%, respectively).  
Through the support of the level of output, income and employment, state 
intervention also contributed to accommodate the relevant deleverage process of 
the private sector. In fact, after the excesses committed in the period prior to the 
outbreak of the crisis, which was characterized by abundant and cheap money, fi-
nancial institutions, families, and companies began a process of reducing their 
degree of indebtedness. Consequently, in all periphery countries, the private debt 
considerably increased up to 2008, decelerating, stabilizing, or even being reduced 
ever since. on the other hand, the public debt had the inverse behavior: it remai-
ned relatively stable up to 2008, considerably increasing in the following years. 
Graph 2 displays this process. It shows, on the one hand, the variation (in 
percentage points) of the public debt/GDP ratio between 2008 and 2012 for the 
27 countries that were part of the EU up to 2012, and, on the other hand, the ratio 
between: a) the variation (in percentage points) of the private debt/GDP ratio be-
tween 2008 and 2012; and b) the variation (in percentage points) of the private 
debt/GDP ratio between 2004 and 2008; considering the countries whose data 
were available. Except for a few economies of the region, it can be observed that 
the public debt/GDP ratio increased substantially between 2008 and 2012, while 
the indicator related to private debt was inferior to the unit, indicating a decelera-
tion of the growth of private debt/GSP, or below zero, indicating a reduction of 
the specified ratio between 2004-2008 and 2008-2012. For instance, in Spain, the 
public debt/GDP ratio increased 46 percentage points of GDP between 2008 and 
2012, while the calculated indicator of private debt was -0.3, the quotient between 
the fall of 15.1 percentage points of the private debt/GDP ratio between 2008 and 
2012 and the increase of 57.5 percentage points of this same ratio between 2004 
20 In view of the fragmentation of productive chains that occurred throughout the regional integration 
process, with the stages of smaller added value restricted to the less developed economies of bloc, this 
policy tends to make intraregional exports more expensive. Nevertheless, this expensiveness can be 
neutralized by making different stages of the productive process cheaper through an increase in 
productivity, for example. 
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and 2008. Germany was the only country among those of the Eurozone whose 
data of private debt/GDP ratio were available, which began to show a reduction of 
this ratio after 2004; while the public debt increased 15 percentage points within 
the aforementioned time, the private debt/GDP ratio varied -4.6 percentage points 
between 2004 and 2008 and -9.7% between 2008 and 2012.21
The fiscal adjustment carried out by the peripheral countries was not effecti-
vely able to avoid the increase of public indebtedness due to the impact of these 
measures on the level of activity and, consequently, on the receipts of the govern-
ments of those countries. Moreover, it must be observed that while the coun-
tercyclical state intervention has occurred in the context of the recent crisis, com-
pared to that of the Great Depression, it can be claimed that it was too late and 
also insufficient to avoid exceptional falls of GDP levels in the different countries 
of the region. Additionally, although cooperation among countries has been grea-
ter now than before, it was also absolutely insufficient to handle with the disrup-
tive effects caused by the logic of operation of increasingly liberalized and deregu-
lated markets in a context marked by the exceptional reduction of autonomy over 
economic policy of the economies of the Eurozone. 
Graph 2: European Union countries’ public debt and  
private debt behaviors (selected indicators)
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Source: IMF e OECD. Elaborated by the authors. 
Note: Left axis (A): change in percentage points in the public debt/GDP between 2008 and 2012; right axis 
(B): ratio between change (in percentage points) of the ratio between Private Debt/GDP between 2008 and 
2012 and between 2004 and 2008.
21 Among the Eurozone countries where data on private debt and GDP are available, Germany was the 
only one to have a negative variation (in percentage points) of this rate between 2004 and 2008. 
Therefore, in the case of this country, the indicator of private debt was submitted with the numerator 
of the ratio in module. 
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Finally, Table 3 shows the evolution of public debt in both periods. The public 
debt considerably increased after 1929, during the Great Depression, and after 
2008, during the current European Crisis, in almost all considered countries, either 
because the governments of those countries increased their expenses or because 
their receipts were reduced due to the fall of production. It is true that govern-
ments of some of the countries attempted to reduce their expenses and to increase 
their receipts, but the impact of these measures on output, income, and employ-
ment levels made it impracticable to reduce the debt. The case of peripheral coun-
tries in the current European crisis is emblematic. These countries were forced to 
implement strict fiscal adjustments in order to be able to apply for the financial 
assistance mechanisms. however, this did not prevent the deterioration of public 
accounts from the point of view of indebtedness, due to a sharp retraction of the 
level of activity and the high burden of interest levied over the debt. Between 2008 
and 2013, the public debt increased by 120% in Spain, 21% in Greece, 171% in 
Ireland, and 71% in Portugal. Greece had the greatest public debt related to GDP 
before the crisis among all countries of the EU 103.1% compared to 23.9% of 
Ireland, 35.5% of Spain, and 68.4% of Portugal. 
Table 3: Public debt (selected countries)  
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CoNCLUSIoN
This paper demonstrated that, as the British gold standard, the institutionality 
of the Euro induces the deflationary adjustment of participating economies during 
periods characterized by adversities. In this sense, as in the case of the Great De-
pression in 1930’s, overcoming the recent European crisis requires the adoption of 
countercyclical economic policies, as well as an increase in cooperation among the 
countries of the region. Nevertheless, the measures imposed by the markets and 
sanctioned by the European institutions for the peripheral countries of the region 
ignore the true nature of the problems faced by the economies that integrate the 
monetary union in Europe. 
Therefore, the overcome of the crisis in the region requires the reform of the 
institutional arrangement that supports the Euro. This means that, in the terms of 
Minsky (1986), the European Central Bank must operate as a “Big Bank” and the 
national governments as “Big Governments”. however, without a cooperation 
system among the countries of the region, led by the regional hegemonic center, 
this strategy would become impracticable, especially with regard to the coun-
tercyclical action of national governments. 
The monetary union was not followed by a fiscal arrangement able to assure 
transferences of resources among European countries if needed. Currently, the 
budget of the EU is rather modest and must always be kept balanced, as it is not 
allowed to obtain resources in the market by issuing debt bonds. This prevents it 
from operating as a stabilization instrument in countries with difficulties, functio-
ning in a countercyclical way. But a process of this kind is hardly feasible without 
a high degree of political integration between European countries and, consequen-
tly, without the constitution of a “European federation”. 
Regarding the impossibility of adjusting the nominal exchange rate within the 
institutionality landmarks of the Euro, on one hand, and the importance of interre-
gional trade to countries of the Eurozone, on the other, the sustained recovery of 
economies of the region could occur upon an agreement between superavit and de-
ficit countries led by the regional hegemonic country, which can include other mea-
sures such as the adoption of commercial policies that favor the countries in distress. 
The measures oriented towards the implementation of a deflationary adjust-
ment imposed by the markets and sanctioned by the European authorities ignore 
the true nature of the problems faced by the countries of the monetary union and 
thus make it impossible to implement effective actions in order to overcome them. 
The deflationary adjustment is a consequence of a regional integration project that 
failed to include adequate cooperation measures among member countries, thus 
betraying its original intentions.
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